BMP4_MaritimeSecurity.Asia

• Safety Policy
• Safety Training
• Safety Management Systems
• Safety Culture
• Organizational Learning
• Human Factors
• Occupational Safety
• Risk Assessment and Management
• Catastrophe Modeling
• Emergency Management
• Crisis Management

• Barriers to Safety and Crisis Planning
• Communicating Safety and Risk Issues with Customers
• Role of Industry Organizations
• Safety Planning
• Crisis Recovery Marketing
• Decision Support Systems and Software Tools for Safety and Crisis Management
• Fire Safety Engineering
• Evacuation Modeling
• Crowd Engineering and Management
• Future Safety and Crisis Risks

1. Special Session on Cultural Protection Management

2. Special Session on Fire Engineering in South Europe

3. Special Session on Global Destination Management Organizations-Best Practices

4. Special Session on Migrant Workers and Safety

5. Special Session on Risk Perception

6. Special Session on Risk Management in SMEs and Corporations

7. Special Session on Crisis and Business Continuity Management

• Safety Science
• International Journal of Tourism Policy

• Visit Peristerona Village – visit the Byzantine monastery and have coffee at the local coffee shop of the village.
• Visit Ayios Ioannis Lambadistis monastery at the mountain village of Kalopanayiotis.
• Visit Kykkos Monastery and Throni tis Panayias.
• Lunch at Markos Tavern in Orkontas village – rich Cypriot buffet and drinks.
• Return to Nicosia late in the afternoon.

• Departure from Nicosia early in the morning
• Visit the Dherynia observatory and the Famagusta Cultural Center.
• Lunch at a Cypriot Tavern by the seaside and bathing
• Visit the Historic Ayia Napa castle and visit to the traditional harbor for Cypriot coffee.
• Return to Nicosia late in the afternoon

Την έναρξη του συνεδρίου χαιρέτισε η Υπουργός Εργασίας και Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων κ. Σωτηρούλα Χαραλάμπους. Τους συνέδρους υποδέχθηκε η Δήμαρχος Λευκωσίας κ. Ελένη Μαύρου, η οποία το έθεσε υπό την αιγίδα της. Μεταξύ άλλων, στην έναρξη, χαιρετισμούς απηύθυναν ο πρόεδρος του ΕΤΕΚ κ. Στέλιος Αχνιώτης, ο αναπληρωτής Γενικός Γραμματέας του ΚΕΒΕ κ. Μάριος Τσιακής, ο πρόεδρος του International Association for Wildland Fires Dr Chuck Bushey, ο Κοσμήτορας της Σχολής Διοίκησης Επιχειρήσεων καθηγητής Ανδρέας Ευσταθιάδης και εκ μέρους της Οργανωτικής Επιτροπής ο δρ Γιώργος Μπούστρας.

There are three main maritime security activities conducted by the Coast Guard:

• Port Security.
• Vessel Security.
• Facility Security.

See Anti-frogman techniques for precautions against underwater attack.

Legal Background

The principle laws that support this mission of the United States Coast Guard are:

• Espionage Act of 1917 - This act empowered the Coast Guard to make regulations to prevent damage to harbors and vessels during national security emergencies.
• Magnuson Act, 1950 – Enacted as a result of the “Red Scare,” this act provided permanent port security regulations, and broad powers to search vessels in U.S. waters and control the movement of foreign vessels in U.S. ports.
• Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 1972 – Resulting from several major groundings and oil spills, this act provided port safety authority beyond the Magnuson Act to protect the use of port transportation facilities, and to enhance efforts against the degradation of the marine environment.
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 or MTSA – Enacted as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. This Act provided sweeping new authorities for preventing acts of terrorism within the U.S. maritime domain.
• The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 2002 – Adopted by the International Maritime Organization as new provisions to the International Convention for SOLAS to enhance maritime security.

Port Security

The Port Security requirements found in the MTSA requires security measures for U.S. ports in order to reduce the risks and to mitigate the results of an act that threatens the security of personnel, facilities, vessels, and the public. The regulations draw together assets within port boundaries to provide a framework to communicate, identify risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and consequences. TheCOTP must ensure that the total port security posture is accurately assessed, and that security resources are appropriate to meet these programs. The COTP must identify critical assets within a port, develop a prioritized list of those most susceptible to acts of sabotage, and plan for adequate security measures to meet specific needs.

Vessel Security

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate vessel security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of vessels to designate security officers for vessels, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the vessel’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels.

Facility Security

A facility is defined as: any structure or facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and used, operated, or maintained by a public or private entity, including any contiguous or adjoining property under common ownership or operation. Some examples of facilities are:

• Barge fleeting facilities.
• Container terminals.
• Oil storage facilities.
• Passenger vessel terminals.

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities are generally offshore fixed platforms in water depths ranging up to 1,000 feet deep whose primary purpose is the exploration, development, and/or product of offshore petroleum reserves. This definition also includes novel floating design such as:

• Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).
• Floating Production Facilities (converted MODUs).
• Floating Production Storage Offloading units (FPSO).

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate facility security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of facilities to designate security officers for facilities, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the facility’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels. Those facilities designated as Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities must meet the same security requirements as those designated as waterfront facilities.

When US Navy merchant vessels are in dangerous waters, security detachments are posted on the vessel. Security forces have helped deter piracy as well as terrorist attacks, such as the Maersk Alabama and the USS Cole. US Navy merchant vessels normally train the deck department in firearms training, but the added Navy security detail provides for extra security. Additionally, Navy escorts might sometimes accompany the vessels, such as traveling through the Straights of Gibraltar.

External links

• A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
• The Naval Institute On Maritime Security
• Maritime Security Specialists for the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean
• Port and Maritime Security Online
• Maritime Security Research Center
• Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security

The Government of Djibouti does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government made efforts to arrest traffickers and sustained partnerships with international organizations and foreign governments to address the confluence of human trafficking with smuggling in Djibouti. However, it did not improve implementation of the protection or prevention components of its anti-trafficking law, even within the government’s limited capacity. Specifically, the government did not take steps to improve efforts to criminally prosecute traffickers or institute procedures for law enforcement or other government authorities to identify and refer trafficking victims to available services. Addressing migrant smuggling and daunting refugee flows remained a main concern, diverting government attention and limited law enforcement resources that might otherwise have been devoted to detecting and responding to forms of trafficking occurring within the country’s borders.

Recommendations for Djibouti: Continue and expand a nationwide campaign to educate government officials and the general public on human trafficking, particularly highlighting the appropriate treatment of domestic workers under Djiboutian law; continue to work with judges, prosecutors, and police to clarify and apply the difference between cases of human trafficking and alien smuggling, particularly regarding courts’ application of Law 210 to cases of alien smuggling; form partnerships with local religious leaders, building their capacity and encouraging them to educate their congregations about trafficking; enforce the anti-trafficking statute through investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenders responsible for child prostitution, domestic servitude, or other forced labor offenses and provide data on convictions and sentences for trafficking offenders; institute a module on human trafficking as a standard part of the mandatory training program for new police and border guards; establish policies and procedures for government officials to proactively identify and interview potential trafficking victims and transfer them to the care, when appropriate, of local organizations; ensure police and relevant social welfare workers receive clear instructions regarding their specific roles and responsibilities in combating trafficking and protecting victims; and expand mechanisms for providing protective services to victims, possibly through the forging of partnerships with civil society or international organizations.

Prosecution

The government made modest efforts to enforce laws against human trafficking during the reporting period. Djibouti’s Law 210, “Regarding the Fight Against Human Trafficking,” enacted in December 2007, prohibits both forced labor and sex trafficking. The law also provides for the protection of victims regardless of ethnicity, gender, or nationality, and prescribes penalties of up to 30 years’ imprisonment for convicted trafficking offenders. These penalties are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Djiboutian law enforcement officers participated in human trafficking training programs sponsored by international organizations and foreign governments during the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government reported a total of 20 arrests related to trafficking under Law 210, down from 78 in 2009. The government did not, however, report any statistics on prosecutions, convictions, or sentences for forced prostitution or forced labor. Djiboutian authorities did not demonstrate concerted efforts to investigate or punish child trafficking, domestic servitude, or other forced labor offenses, nor did the government report any efforts to investigate or punish government officials complicit in trafficking offenses during the reporting period.

Protection

The government’s efforts to protect victims of trafficking increased slightly, but remained weak overall during the reporting period. With few resources itself and a small pool of underfunded NGO partners, the government had little means with which to address the needs of trafficking victims during the year. In December 2010, government officials received training from IOM and foreign governments on direct assistance to victims of trafficking. During 2010, IOM reported identifying 20 Ethiopian victims of trafficking, including 10 victims of forced labor, who were assisted through IOM in returning to their home communities. Djiboutian police reported rescuing 163 children from prostitution and providing them with basic medical services. It is unclear what protection services the government provided to these victims after their medical care. Djiboutian authorities did not have a formal, comprehensive system to proactively identify victims of trafficking among high-risk populations, such as illegal immigrants and those arrested for prostitution. The government regularly deported undocumented foreigners and there was no evidence that authorities screened them for indicators of human trafficking. Children found in prostitution may have been arrested, but reportedly were not charged with crimes. After detaining children on suspicion of engaging in prostitution, police indicated that they attempted to locate and meet their parents or other family members to discuss appropriate child protection; children were then released to the care of family members. When family members could not be found, foreign children may have been deported to their country of origin; the government did not report data on such deportations. Police worked with the Ministry of Health’s clinic and hospitals, and with NGOs, to provide some medical care to victims of child prostitution. The Government of Djibouti did not provide shelter or services directly to victims of trafficking, but collaborated with international and non-governmental institutions who offer such help. Although victims of trafficking were permitted to file civil suits against their traffickers, there did not appear to be any concerted encouragement from the government for victims to assist in criminal investigations of their traffickers. Foreign victims of trafficking are not offered legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they may face hardship or retribution.

Prevention

The government sustained partnerships with international organizations to prevent trafficking in persons. Addressing concerns for migrants who depart Djiboutian shores for intended illegal entry to Yemen, the government continued its partnership with IOM to inform immigrants of the potential dangers of irregular migration. The government worked to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by continuing to investigate some child prostitution cases and deploying a regular police vice squad. The government did not take any known measures to reduce the demand for forced labor.

1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT
1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration
& Nationality Directorate, Home Office from information obtained from a variety of sources.
1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the
asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended
to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in
asylum claims made in the United Kingdom
1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost
to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the
source material is readily available in the public domain.
1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains
within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.
1.5 An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following
organisations:

SOMALIA ASSESSMENT

Final report 
Assessment and recommendations
1. The situation in Somalia 
2. Piracy around the world 
3. Understanding piracy in Somalia 
4. The Legal Framework 
5. The costs of piracy 
6. The costs of doing nothing on land 
7. What has already been done 
8. Recommendations

somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated

Methods may differ whether it is about general financial decisions or environmental, ecological, or public health risk assessment.

Explanation

Risk assessment consists in an objective evaluation of risk in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly considered and presented. Part of the difficulty of risk management is that measurement of both of the quantities in which risk assessment is concerned – potential loss and probability of occurrence – can be very difficult to measure. The chance of error in the measurement of these two concepts is large. A risk with a large potential loss and a low probability of occurring is often treated differently from one with a low potential loss and a high likelihood of occurring. In theory, both are of nearly equal priority in dealing with first, but in practice it can be very difficult to manage when faced with the scarcity of resources, especially time, in which to conduct the risk management process. Expressed mathematically,

Risk assessment from a financial point of view.

Financial decisions, such as insurance, express loss in terms of dollar amounts. When risk assessment is used for public health or environmental decisions, loss can be quantified in a common metric,such as a country’s currency, or some numerical measure of a location’s quality of life. For public health and environmental decisions, loss is simply a verbal description of the outcome, such as increased cancer incidence or incidence of birth defects. In that case, the “risk” is expressed as:

If the risk estimate takes into account information on the number of individuals exposed, it is termed a “population risk” and is in units of expected increased cases per a time period. If the risk estimate does not take into account the number of individuals exposed, it is termed an “individual risk” and is in units of incidence rate per a time period. Population risks are of more use for cost/benefit analysis; individual risks are of more use for evaluating whether risks to individuals are “acceptable”….

Risk assessment in public health

In the context of public health, risk assessment is the process of quantifying the probability of a harmful effect to individuals or populations from certain human activities. In most countries, the use of specific chemicals, or the operations of specific facilities (e.g. power plants, manufacturing plants) is not allowed unless it can be shown that they do not increase the risk of death or illness above a specific threshold. For example, the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food safety through risk assessment.^[1] The FDA required in 1973 that cancer-causing compounds must not be present in meat at concentrations that would cause a cancer risk greater than 1 in a million lifetimes. The US Environmental Protection Agency provides basic information about environmental risk assessments for the public via its risk assessment portal.^[2]

How the risk is determined

In the estimation of the risks, three or more steps are involved, requiring the inputs of different disciplines:

1. Hazard Identification, aims to determine the qualitative nature of the potential adverse consequences of the contaminant (chemical, radiation, noise, etc.) and the strength of the evidence it can have that effect. This is done, for chemical hazards, by drawing from the results of the sciences of toxicology and epidemiology. For other kinds of hazard, engineering or other disciplines are involved.
2. Dose-Response Analysis, is determining the relationship between dose and the probability or the incidence of effect (dose-response assessment). The complexity of this step in many contexts derives mainly from the need to extrapolate results from experimental animals (e.g. mouse, rat) to humans, and/or from high to lower doses. In addition, the differences between individuals due to genetics or other factors mean that the hazard may be higher for particular groups, called susceptible populations. An alternative to dose-response estimation is to determine an effect unlikely to yield observable effects, that is, a no effect concentration. In developing such a dose, to account for the largely unknown effects of animal to human extrapolations, increased variability in humans, or missing data, a prudent approach is often adopted by including safety factors in the estimate of the “safe” dose, typically a factor of 10 for each unknown step.
3. Exposure Quantification, aims to determine the amount of a contaminant (dose) that individuals and populations will receive. This is done by examining the results of the discipline of exposure assessment. As different location, lifestyles and other factors likely influence the amount of contaminant that is received, a range or distribution of possible values is generated in this step. Particular care is taken to determine the exposure of the susceptible population(s).

Finally, the results of the three steps above are then combined to produce an estimate of risk. Because of the different susceptibilities and exposures, this risk will vary within a population.

Small subpopulations

When risks apply mainly to small subpopulations, there is uncertainty at which point intervention is necessary. What if a risk is very low for everyone but 0.1% of the population? A difference exists whether this 0.1% is represented by *all infants younger than X days or *recreational users of a particular product. If the risk is higher for a particular sub-population because of abnormal exposure rather than susceptibility, there is a potential to consider strategies to further reduce the exposure of that subgroup. If an identifiable sub-population is more susceptible due to inherent genetic or other factors, there is a policy choice whether to set policies for protecting the general population that are protective of such groups (as is currently done for children when data exists, or is done under the Clean Air Act for populations such as asthmatics) or whether if the group is too small, or the costs to high. Sometimes, a more specific calculation can be applied whether it is more important to analyze each method specifically the changes of the risk assessment method in containing all problems that each of us people could replace.

Acceptable risk increase

The idea of not increasing lifetime risk by more than one in a million has become common place in public health discourse and policy. How consensus settled on this particular figure is unclear. In some respects, this figure has the characteristics of a mythical number. In another sense, the figure provides a numerical basis for what to consider a negligible increase in risk. Some current environmental decision making allows some discretion to deem individual risks potentially “acceptable” if below one in ten thousand increased lifetime risk. Low risk criteria such as these do provide some protection for the case that individuals may be exposed to multiple chemicals (whether pollutants or food additives, or other chemicals). But both of these benchmarks are clearly small relative to the typical one in four lifetime risk of death by cancer (due to all causes combined) in developed countries. On the other hand, adoption of a zero-risk policy could be motivated by the fact that the 1 in a million policy still would cause the death of hundreds or thousands of people in a large enough population. In practice however, a true zero-risk is possible only with the suppression of the risk-causing activity.

More stringent requirements, or even the 1 in a million one, may not be technologically feasible at a given time, or so expensive as to render the risk-causing activity unsustainable, resulting in the optimal degree of intervention being a balance between risks vs. benefit. For example, it might well be that the emissions from hospital incinerators result in a certain number of deaths per year. However, this risk must be balanced against the available alternatives. In some unusual cases, there are significant public health risks, as well as economic costs, associated with all options. For example, there are risks associated with noincineration (with the potential risk for spread of infectious diseases) or even no hospitals. But, often further investigation identifies further options, such as separating noninfectious from infectious wastes, or air pollution controls on a medical incinerator, that provide a broad range of options of acceptable risk – though with varying practical implications and varying economic costs. Intelligent thought about a reasonably full set of options is essential. Thus, it is not unusual for there to be an iterative process between analysis, consideration of options, and then further analysis.

Risk assessment in auditing

In auditing, risk assessment is a very crucial stage before accepting an audit engagement. According to ISA315 Understanding the Entity and its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, “the auditor should perform risk assessment procedures to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control.”<evidence relating to the auditor’s risk assessment of a material misstatement in the client’s financial statements. Then, auditor obtains initial evidence regarding the classes of transactions at the client and the operating effectiveness of the client’s internal controls.In auditing, audit risk includes inherent risk, control risk and detection risk.

Risk assessment and human health

There are many resources that provide health risk information. The National Library of Medicine provides risk assessment and regulation information tools for a varied audience.^[3] These include TOXNET (databases on hazardous chemicals, environmental health, and toxic releases),^[4] the Household Products Database (potential health effects of chemicals in over 10,000 common household products),^[5] and TOXMAP (maps of US Environmental Agency Superfund and Toxics Release Inventory data). The United States Environmental Protection Agency provides basic information about environmental risk assessments for the public.^[6]

Risk assessment in information security

IT risk assessment can be performed by a qualitative or quantitative approach, following different methodologies.

Risk assessment in project management

In project management, risk assessment is an integral part of the risk management plan, studying the probability, the impact, and the effect of every known risk on the project, as well as the corrective action to take should that risk occur.^[7]

Risk assessment for megaprojects

Megaprojects (sometimes also called “major programs”) are extremely large-scale investment projects, typically costing more than US$1 billion per project. Megaprojects include bridges, tunnels, highways, railways, airports, seaports, power plants, dams, wastewater projects, coastal flood protection, oil and natural gas extraction projects, public buildings, information technology systems, aerospace projects, and defence systems. Megaprojects have been shown to be particularly risky in terms of finance, safety, and social and environmental impacts. Risk assessment is therefore particularly pertinent for megaprojects and special methods and special education have been developed for such risk assessment.^[8][9]

Quantitative risk assessment

Quantitative risk assessments include a calculation of the single loss expectancy (SLE) of an asset. The single loss expectancy can be defined as the loss of value to asset based on a single security incident. The team then calculates the Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) of the threat to the asset. The ARO is an estimate based on the data of how often a threat would be successful in exploiting a vulnerability. From this information, the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) can be calculated. The annualized loss expectancy is a calculation of the single loss expectancy multiplied by the annual rate of occurrence, or how much an organization could estimate to lose from an asset based on the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. It then becomes possible from a financial perspective to justify expenditures to implement countermeasures to protect the asset.

Risk assessment in software evolution

Studies have shown that early parts of the system development cycle such as requirements and design specifications are especially prone to error. This effect is particularly notorious in projects involving multiple stakeholders with different points of view. Evolutionary software processes offer an iterative approach to requirement engineering to alleviate the problems of uncertainty, ambiguity and inconsistency inherent in software developments.

Criticisms of quantitative risk assessment

Barry Commoner, Brian Wynne and other critics have expressed concerns that risk assessment tends to be overly quantitative and reductive. For example, they argue that risk assessments ignore qualitative differences among risks. Some charge that assessments may drop out important non-quantifiable or inaccessible information, such as variations among the classes of people exposed to hazards. Furthermore, Commoner and O’Brien claim that quantitative approaches divert attention from precautionary or preventative measures.^[10] Others, like Nassim Nicholas Taleb consider risk managers little more than “blind users” of statistical tools and methods.^[11]

A Thomson flight, en route from Bristol to Sharm el Sheikh, diverted to Athens after a phone call was received claiming a bomb was on board.

22 APRIL       TAIPEI

TransAsia Airways’ Kaohsiung branch office received a call from a man who said that his friend was unhappy with the airline and that he would be taking a bomb with him on a flight from Kaohsiung to one of the outlying islands.

24 APRIL       BRUSSELS

A Wizzair flight bound for Sofia was delayed for three hours because of a bomb threat.

29 APRIL       NEW YORK

Christian Boncorps, 61, allegedly told an Air France ticket agent at JFK that “My name is bin Laden, and I have a bomb in my bag” when checking in for his flight to Paris. Boncorps was charged with filing a false report and later fined $250.

29 APRIL       EL CALAFATE, CALIFORNIA

An Aerolineas Argentinas flight en route from Buenos Aires to El Calafate was the target of a bomb threat.

8 MAY           ALBUQUERQUE

A Delta Air Lines flight from Detroit to San Diego was forced to make an unscheduled stop in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

14 MAY         HO CHI MINH CITY

Mariano Francois Xavier Jean Agostini, 27, was arrested on boarding a Vietnam Airlines to Da Nang after he was overheard telling a Vietnamese woman that he had a bomb in his cabin baggage.

15 MAY         RHODE ISLAND

A woman was escorted off a Mesaba Airlines flight departing T.F. Green Airport after she allegedly made a threatening comment.

16 MAY         ISTANBUL

A passenger booked on a Turkish Airlines flight to Stuttgart made a bomb threat after he arrived late for the flight and was denied boarding.

17 MAY         FLORIDA

David Michael Smith, 37, allegedly made a bomb threat at Southwest Florida International Airport.

18 MAY         MELBOURNE

The Australian media were sent letters threatening attacks at both Avalon and Tullamarine airports.

19 MAY         TEREVAN, ARMENIA

A man claimed that there was a bomb at Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport resulting in the terminal being evacuated.

22 MAY         YEREVAN, ARMENIA

An anonymous caller claimed that there was a bomb on board an aircraft preparing to depart Yerevan Zvartnots Airport for Amsterdam.

25 MAY         SURABAYA, INDONESIA

Garuda Airlines received a threat by fax citing both Surabaya and Jakarta’s airports. In Surabaya’s departure lounge, a suspicious package was found containing liquids.