Mr Shapiro delivered an on-the-record address on the Obama Administration’s policies to combat piracy. His remarks launced the IISS-US Policy Makers Series.

Andrew Shapiro is the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. Previously, he served as Senior Advisor to Secretary Clinton and was the Senior Defense and Foreign Policy Advisor during her tenure in the Senate. Mr Shapiro received a joint law and masters in international affairs degree from Columbia University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

As Prepared

Good afternoon and thank you Dr. Parasiliti for having me here today. For more than a half century the IISS has been one of the leading think tanks in international affairs not just in the UK, but in the world. I can not think of a better venue to speak with you about the challenges of piracy emanating from Somalia that now threatens maritime traffic across the entire Indian Ocean. IISS highlighted the problem of modern piracy before many were aware it existed. It was this organization that presciently warned in 2007 of the threat piracy would grow and spread, and IISS has continued to speak out against this international scourge.

Piracy is an age old problem. Pirates in the Mediterranean plagued the Roman Republic. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century piracy bedeviled European merchant ships in the Caribbean and elsewhere. America, too, confronted piracy in its earliest days. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, U.S. merchant ships and crews were subject to routine attacks by pirates from the Barbary States of North Africa. For years, it was deemed cheaper to pay them off than to fight. Then, as now, this answer proved counterproductive and unsustainable. The United States intensified its military and diplomatic efforts, eventually ending the tribute payments to Barbary pirates in 1815. The problem of how to deal with rogue individuals determined to exploit the security weaknesses in commercial maritime trade is not a new problem.

Yet the modern day implications of piracy are now global in scope. In today’s globalized age the problem of piracy is one that affects not just individual countries or shipping companies but potentially the entire global economy. We live in an era of complex and integrated global supply chains where people in countries around the world depend on safe and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their energy, their medicine, and basic consumer goods. By threatening one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, piracy off the Horn of Africa threatens not just specific ships, but has broader strategic implications.

The problem is both significant and urgent.

Despite two years of international political and naval coordination, the problem is growing worse. Last year, 2010, witnessed the highest number of successful pirate attacks and hostages taken on record. And thus far 2011 is on track to be even higher. Close to 600 mariners from around the world are being held hostage in the region, some for as long as six months. Tragically, four Americans were brutally murdered by Somali pirates just last month.

The attacks are more ruthless, more violent and wider ranging. Hostages have been tortured and used as human shields and blowtorches have been used to open safe haven areas on ships in order to seize crews, and hold them for ransom. Pirates currently hold around 30 ships, most for ransom.

As international action has been taken to address the challenge, the pirates have responded. The way pirates operate has become more sophisticated. In recent months the use of mother ships – which are themselves pirated ships with hostage crews – has extended the pirates’ reach far beyond the Somali Basin. Mother ships launch and re-supply groups of pirates who use smaller, faster boats for attacks. They can carry dozens of pirates and tow many skiffs for multiple simultaneous attacks.

This has made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective at operating in seasonal monsoons that previously restricted their activities. Somali pirates now operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square nautical miles, an increase from approximately 1 million square nautical miles two years ago. This increase makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to disrupt an ongoing attack.

At Secretary Clinton’s direction, we are intensively reviewing our counter-piracy efforts to determine an even more energetic and comprehensive approach to respond to piracy in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean region. As we move forward, we are looking into many additional possible courses of action that seek to overcome the ongoing challenges of piracy.

In the near and mid-term, we plan to focus on several approaches that have the potential to significantly increase risks to the pirates while reducing by equal measure any potential rewards that they think they may gain. We are considering a broad range of options, from intensifying naval operations, to pursuing innovative approaches to prosecute and incarcerate pirates through innovative national and international approaches. Furthermore, we are looking at additional ways to more aggressively target those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations, including disrupting the financial networks that support them.

But before I go into depth on our way forward, let me discuss briefly the actions that are already underway.

To address the problem, the United States has, from the beginning, adopted a multilateral approach. Piracy affects the international community as a whole and can only be effectively addressed through broad, coordinated, and comprehensive international efforts. In January 2009, we helped establish the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which now includes over 60 nations as well as international and industry organizations, to help coordinate national and international counter-piracy policies and actions.

We have also developed an integrated multi-dimensional approach toward combating piracy that focuses on: security – through the projection of military power to defend commercial and private vessels; prevention – through best practices measures conducted by the private sector; and deterrence – through effective legal prosecution and incarceration.

I’ll now expand on each of these areas:

First, security. In an effort to prevent attacks, the United States established Combined Task Force 151 — a multinational task force charged with conducting counter-piracy naval patrols in the region. The objective of this Combined Task Force is to secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. It operates in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, covering an area of over one million square miles. In addition to this effort, we have a number of coordinated multi-national naval patrols off the Horn of Africa. NATO is engaging in Operation Ocean Shield, the European Union has Operation ATALANTA, and other national navies in the area conduct counter-piracy patrols as well. On any given day up to 30 vessels from as many as 20 nations are engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region, including countries new to these kinds of effort like China and Japan.

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) has also worked with partners to set up a 463-mile long corridor through the Gulf of Aden, called the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor or IRTC for short. This transit zone for commercial shipping is heavily patrolled by naval forces and used by some countries for convoy operations. Use of the IRTC has been successful in reducing the number of attacks within the corridor. But it also has had the unfortunate side effect of pushing pirate activities elsewhere, outside of the corridor. Naval forces are limited in their ability to disrupt attacks beyond the IRTC – there are simply an insufficient number of ships, helicopters, and overhead surveillance assets to patrol much beyond the corridor. International naval cooperation will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future to help protect shipping and interdict pirate attacks, but naval presence on its own will be insufficient to prevent or measurably deter piracy beyond the IRTC. There is just too much open water to patrol.

The second area we have focused on is prevention. Any effective approach to combating piracy must involve the private sector. To prevent pirate activity, we have encouraged the commercial and private vessels to take action to prevent piracy before it happens.

The shipping industry is increasingly implementing industry-developed “best management practices” to prevent pirate boardings before they take place.

These guidelines were developed to identify self-protection measures that have proven successful in preventing boarding and seizure, and enabling rescues by naval forces when boarded. They include practical measures, such as:

proceeding at full speed through high risk areas,

placing additional lookouts on watches,

using closed circuit television to monitor vulnerable areas,

employing physical barriers such as razor wire,

reporting positions to military authorities, and

mustering the crew inside safe haven areas of the vessel.

These measures, when properly implemented, remain the most effective manner to protect against pirate attacks.

At the same time, there are vessels using the shipping lanes along the coast of Somalia that do not implement these recommended security measures. Approximately 20 percent of all ships off the Horn of Africa are not employing best management practices or taking proper security precautions. These 20 percent account for the overwhelming number of successfully pirated ships. These companies either deem these measures as not cost-effective or they unrealistically, some might say wishfully, assume that military forces will be present to intervene if pirates attack. As a result, some in the industry have been unwilling to invest in the basic security measures that would render them less vulnerable to attack.

We continue to discourage ransom payments and to actively seek to deny the benefits of concessions to hostage takers. The increase in attacks over the last year is a direct result of the enormous amounts of ransom now being paid to pirates. The United States has a long tradition of opposing the payment of ransom, and we have worked diligently to discourage or minimize ransoms. But many governments and private entities are paying, often too quickly and to the detriment of future victims, the escalating ransoms that enable the pirates’ predatory behavior. Some consider it the cost of doing business. However, every ransom paid, which now averages $4 million per incident and has reached as much as $9.2 million dollars, further institutionalizes the practice of hostage-taking for profit and funds its expansion as a criminal enterprise. Since January 2010, Somali pirates received approximately $75-85 million in the form of ransom payments. Of course, companies want to get their crews, ships, and cargoes back, but we have to find a way to break this cycle of increasing the pirates’ success and to shut down this ballooning criminal enterprise that makes piracy an increasingly lucrative profession, especially for the impoverished Horn of Africa.

Third, to deter piracy, effective legal prosecution is vital. We are urging all states to share the burden of prosecuting suspected pirates in their national courts, and incarcerating those convicted.

When attacks do occur, the international community needs effective and appropriate ways of dealing with captured pirates. Under international law, piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. This means that all states are authorized under international law to prosecute cases of piracy, whether or not that state has a direct link to the event. We applaud the approximately 18 countries that have pursued the prosecution of almost 950 pirates in their national courts. However, despite this figure, a significant number of suspected pirates encountered by naval forces are still being released without being prosecuted, sometimes for lack of evidence. We have not seen evidence that the prosecutions to date have had a deterrent effect, probably not least because pirates are reaping enormous returns with relatively little risk.

In addition, many of the countries affected by piracy – flag states, states from where many crew members hail, and many of our European partners – have proven to lack either the capacity or the political will to prosecute cases in their national courts. Furthermore, states in the region that have accepted suspects for prosecution to date have been reluctant to take more, citing limits to their judicial and prison capacities and insufficient financial support from the international community. As a result, too many suspected pirates we encounter at sea are simply released without any meaningful punishment or prosecution, and often simply keep doing what they were doing. This is the unacceptable ‘catch and release’ situation that has been widely criticized, and for which we must find a solution.

This multi-dimensional approach, focusing on security by expanding naval activities, emphasizing prevention through encouraging best practice measures by the private sector, and providing a deterrent through legal prosecution, provides a solid framework for our counter-piracy efforts.

Unfortunately further action is needed. As pirates have adapted their tactics to evade naval counter-piracy operations and shippers’ reliance on best management practices, we must respond in-kind by re-energizing and refocusing our counter-piracy approach. We are dealing with smart, hardened criminals who adapt to changing situations. We need to adapt to and counter their actions while moving forward with the sense of urgency the situation demands.

Before I continue, it is important to recognize thatpiracy’s root cause is state failure in Somalia, and cannot be resolved exclusively through naval patrols and interdictions. The reality is that there will be no end to piracy at sea until there is both political reconciliation and economic recovery on the ground in Somalia and a local government capable of and willing to enforce law and order on land and offshore. Achieving stability and good governance in Somalia represents the only sustainable long-term solution to piracy.

We are currently pursuing a diplomatic dual-track approach in Somalia to support the most important lines of action for countering piracy: building governance, security, and economic livelihoods on land in Somalia. On track one, we continue to support the Transitional Federal Government and the Djibouti Peace Process, as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia.

On track two, we are expanding engagement with local and regional administrations, civil society groups, and Somali clan leaders outside the Djibouti Peace Process who seek stability in Somalia and oppose extremism, including those in Somaliland, Puntland, and parts of South Central Somalia. In coordination with international partners, we will evaluate the utility of increased partnerships with regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with local and regional administrative units throughout South Central Somalia, who are opposed to and who are willing to address piracy and governance concerns.

Achieving the necessary governance improvement throughout Somalia will not happen overnight, but this cannot deter us from supporting every improvement we can for the sake of greater stability in Somalia and, in the process, combating piracy.

Acknowledging the challenge of the situation ashore does not preclude progress at sea. We can make advances in combating piracy, irrespective of the situation in Somalia. But we must understand that this is a problem without a simple solution. There exists no silver bullet to solve modern piracy. Instead, there are a number of measures that can be taken to manage the problem and reduce its impact.

In the near and mid-term we can focus on several approaches that have the potential to significantly increase risks to the pirates while at the same time reduce their potential rewards. We are considering a broad range of options. These center on four key areas: pursuing additional mechanisms to prosecute and incarcerate pirates; aggressively targeting those who organize, lead, and profit from piracy operations; exploring expanded military options that will not place undue risks or burdens on our armed forces; and intensifying efforts to encourage the shipping industry to employ best management practices.

First, on enhancing the prosecution and incarceration of pirates. One of our major efforts to counter piracy has been to find creative ways to increase the ability and willingness of other states to undertake what should be a national responsibility to hold criminals accountable for attacks on national interests. The United States has actively prosecuted pirates involved in attacks on U.S. vessels where there has been sufficient evidence to support the case. To date, that totals 26 persons involved in several attacks:

the April 2009 attack on the MAERSK ALABAMA,

attacks in April of last year on the USS NICHOLAS and the USS ASHLAND,

and most recently, the attack in February that resulted in the killing of the four Americans on the QUEST.

Fourteen men, thirteen from Somalia and one frm Yemen, have been indicted on federal criminal charges for their suspected involvement in this heinous incident. The Somali pirate convicted in the MAERSK ALABAMA attack received a sentence of 33 years and 9 months and the pirates involved in the NICHOLAS attack have received life sentences plus 80 years. These successful prosecutions, like the over 900 other national prosecutions taking place around the world, prove that pirates can be successfully prosecuted in any state with the basic judicial capacity and political will to do so.

Despite these successes, we need to acknowledge the reality that many states, to varying degrees, have not demonstrated sustained political will to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and use such laws to prosecute those who attack their interests and incarcerate the convicted. The world’s largest flag registries – so-called “flags of convenience” – have proven either incapable or unwilling to take responsibility. And given the limited venues for prosecution, states have been reluctant to pursue prosecutions of apparent or incomplete acts of piracy, limiting our ability to prosecute suspects not caught in the middle of an attack.

It is true that suspected pirates have been successfully prosecuted in ordinary courts throughout history. Because of this, the Administration has previously been reluctant to support the idea of creating an extraordinary international prosecution mechanism for this common crime. Instead, the Administration has focused on encouraging regional states to prosecute pirates domestically in their national courts. However, in light of the problems I’ve described to you today, the United States is now willing to consider pursuing some creative and innovative ways to go beyond ordinary national prosecutions and enhance our ability to prosecute and incarcerate pirates in a timely and cost-effective manner. We are working actively with our partners in the international community to help set the conditions for expanded options in the region. In fact, we recently put forward a joint proposal with the United Kingdom suggesting concrete steps to address some of the key challenges we continue to face.

One of the most important things we must do is expand incarceration capacity in the region, as lack of prison capacity is perhaps the most common reason states are reluctant to accept pirates for prosecution. We are already seeing progress in this area. Just this week, a new maximum security prison opened in Northern Somalia to hold convicted pirates. We also support the efforts underway to develop a framework to accommodate the transfer of convicted pirates back to Somalia to serve their sentences in their home country.

In addition, we have suggested consideration of a specialized piracy court or chamber to be established in one or more regional states. The international community is currently considering this idea, along with similar models that would combine international and domestic elements. These ideas are under discussion both in the UN Security Council and in the Contact Group.

It is also critical to continue to support and enhance the prosecution-related programs in the region that are already underway. And we continue to believe one of the most vital aspects remains Somalia’s long term ability to construct its own active and independent judicial system.

The second area we are considering is how to more effectively target financial flows from piracy, possibly by using approaches similar to the ones we use to target terrorists.

Somali piracy is an organized criminal enterprise, like a mafia or racketeering criminal organization. A key element of our overall counter-piracy approach is the disruption of piracy-related financial flows. We need to hit pirate supply lines – cutting them off at the source. A significant effort must be made to track where pirates get their fuel, supplies, ladders and outboard motors in Somalia and in other nearby countries and to explore means to disrupt this supply. Most importantly, we must focus on pirate leaders and financiers to deny them the means to benefit from ransom proceeds. They must be tracked and hunted by following the money that fuels their operations using all available information. This should include by tracing the money that fuels their operations with the same level of rigor and discipline we currently employ to combat other transnational organized crime.

This is particularly critical, considering the recent uncorroborated open source reports of possible links, direct or indirect, between al-Shabaab in Somalia – specifically al-Shabaab-linked militia – and pirates. Al-Shabaab and the pirates operate largely in separate geographic areas and have drastically opposed ideologies. However, we have seen reports that al-Shabaab is receiving ad-hoc protection fees from pirate gangs working in the same area. Obviously, this is concerning. Let me be clear: while we have seen no evidence to date of direct ties between the two groups, it would not be uncommon for criminal gangs working in the same ungoverned space to share resources or pay kickbacks to one another.

Finally, it is time to explore additional means to map and disrupt the financial flows and criminal masterminds behind the business of piracy before any links are solidified or money is put into the pockets of a group responsible for terrorist attacks. At the beginning of March, the United States hosted a meeting of Contact Group members at which the international community began discussing the development of methods to detect, track, disrupt, and interdict illicit financial transactions connected to piracy and the criminal networks that finance piracy. As we make progress and pirate leaders are identified, we should press local authorities in the piracy-affected region to take action against these leaders and either prosecute them or turn them over to other states for prosecution. Piracy is impacting Americans’, Africans’, and others’ lives around the world, and we should devote resources commensurate to the problem.

The third area we are exploring for increased action involves additional ways to work with our Department of Defense colleagues to take further action at sea, focusing on steps that would have real impacts on pirate activity without overextending our military. For its part, the United States Navy is already taking proactive measures to remove pirate boats from action when they can do so without unduly risking human life or unnecessarily expending scare resources. Just last week, U.S. naval forces successfully answered a Philippine-flagged merchant vessel’s distress call as pirates attempted to board. U.S. forces, already in the area as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, fired warning shots, causing the pirates to flee and foiling the attack. As American assets were already on the scene, the U.S. military was ready and able to respond without stretching our armed forces too thin.

We at the State Department need to continue to work with our DoD colleagues to explore using other tools at our disposal to further disrupt pirate vessels at sea. Of course, we must always act in a fashion that does not cause the situation on land in Somalia to worsen.

Fourth and finally, we must intensify our efforts to encourage commercial vessels to adopt best management practices. The best defense against piracy is vigilance on the part of the maritime industry. The vast majority of successful pirate attacks are against ships that do not adopt best management practices. The U.S. government requires U.S.-flagged vessels sailing in designated high-risk waters to take additional security measures, including having extra lookouts, having extra communications equipment, and being prepared at all times to evade or resist pirate boarding. I would note that, to date, not a single ship employing armed guards has been successfully pirated.

Combating piracy is not just the job of governments. It requires joint action from both the international community and the private sector. If all commercial fleets worldwide were to implement the measures as appropriate, we would be in a much better position to reduce the rate of successful pirate attacks. Our partners in the maritime industry must continue to step up and take further action to do their part.

In the cat and mouse game of modern day piracy, we must always look for new methods and new approaches to improve our efforts. After all, this is exactly what the pirates are doing. I believe we have the right multi-faceted framework in place to address the challenge. Focusing on security by expanding naval activities; emphasizing prevention by encouraging best practice measures by the private sector and dissuading lavish ransom sums; providing a deterrent through enhanced legal prosecution; and efforts to disrupt the financial flows all provide a solid way forward. There is much work to do in the coming months and years, but through the shared commitment of the United States and the international community the challenge of modern-day piracy is one that we will surely meet.

Thank you. With that, I’d be happy to take a few questions.

BMP4_MaritimeSecurity.Asia

• Safety Policy
• Safety Training
• Safety Management Systems
• Safety Culture
• Organizational Learning
• Human Factors
• Occupational Safety
• Risk Assessment and Management
• Catastrophe Modeling
• Emergency Management
• Crisis Management

• Barriers to Safety and Crisis Planning
• Communicating Safety and Risk Issues with Customers
• Role of Industry Organizations
• Safety Planning
• Crisis Recovery Marketing
• Decision Support Systems and Software Tools for Safety and Crisis Management
• Fire Safety Engineering
• Evacuation Modeling
• Crowd Engineering and Management
• Future Safety and Crisis Risks

1. Special Session on Cultural Protection Management

2. Special Session on Fire Engineering in South Europe

3. Special Session on Global Destination Management Organizations-Best Practices

4. Special Session on Migrant Workers and Safety

5. Special Session on Risk Perception

6. Special Session on Risk Management in SMEs and Corporations

7. Special Session on Crisis and Business Continuity Management

• Safety Science
• International Journal of Tourism Policy

• Visit Peristerona Village – visit the Byzantine monastery and have coffee at the local coffee shop of the village.
• Visit Ayios Ioannis Lambadistis monastery at the mountain village of Kalopanayiotis.
• Visit Kykkos Monastery and Throni tis Panayias.
• Lunch at Markos Tavern in Orkontas village – rich Cypriot buffet and drinks.
• Return to Nicosia late in the afternoon.

• Departure from Nicosia early in the morning
• Visit the Dherynia observatory and the Famagusta Cultural Center.
• Lunch at a Cypriot Tavern by the seaside and bathing
• Visit the Historic Ayia Napa castle and visit to the traditional harbor for Cypriot coffee.
• Return to Nicosia late in the afternoon

Την έναρξη του συνεδρίου χαιρέτισε η Υπουργός Εργασίας και Κοινωνικών Ασφαλίσεων κ. Σωτηρούλα Χαραλάμπους. Τους συνέδρους υποδέχθηκε η Δήμαρχος Λευκωσίας κ. Ελένη Μαύρου, η οποία το έθεσε υπό την αιγίδα της. Μεταξύ άλλων, στην έναρξη, χαιρετισμούς απηύθυναν ο πρόεδρος του ΕΤΕΚ κ. Στέλιος Αχνιώτης, ο αναπληρωτής Γενικός Γραμματέας του ΚΕΒΕ κ. Μάριος Τσιακής, ο πρόεδρος του International Association for Wildland Fires Dr Chuck Bushey, ο Κοσμήτορας της Σχολής Διοίκησης Επιχειρήσεων καθηγητής Ανδρέας Ευσταθιάδης και εκ μέρους της Οργανωτικής Επιτροπής ο δρ Γιώργος Μπούστρας.

There are three main maritime security activities conducted by the Coast Guard:

• Port Security.
• Vessel Security.
• Facility Security.

See Anti-frogman techniques for precautions against underwater attack.

Legal Background

The principle laws that support this mission of the United States Coast Guard are:

• Espionage Act of 1917 - This act empowered the Coast Guard to make regulations to prevent damage to harbors and vessels during national security emergencies.
• Magnuson Act, 1950 – Enacted as a result of the “Red Scare,” this act provided permanent port security regulations, and broad powers to search vessels in U.S. waters and control the movement of foreign vessels in U.S. ports.
• Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 1972 – Resulting from several major groundings and oil spills, this act provided port safety authority beyond the Magnuson Act to protect the use of port transportation facilities, and to enhance efforts against the degradation of the marine environment.
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 or MTSA – Enacted as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. This Act provided sweeping new authorities for preventing acts of terrorism within the U.S. maritime domain.
• The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 2002 – Adopted by the International Maritime Organization as new provisions to the International Convention for SOLAS to enhance maritime security.

Port Security

The Port Security requirements found in the MTSA requires security measures for U.S. ports in order to reduce the risks and to mitigate the results of an act that threatens the security of personnel, facilities, vessels, and the public. The regulations draw together assets within port boundaries to provide a framework to communicate, identify risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and consequences. TheCOTP must ensure that the total port security posture is accurately assessed, and that security resources are appropriate to meet these programs. The COTP must identify critical assets within a port, develop a prioritized list of those most susceptible to acts of sabotage, and plan for adequate security measures to meet specific needs.

Vessel Security

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate vessel security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of vessels to designate security officers for vessels, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the vessel’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels.

Facility Security

A facility is defined as: any structure or facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and used, operated, or maintained by a public or private entity, including any contiguous or adjoining property under common ownership or operation. Some examples of facilities are:

• Barge fleeting facilities.
• Container terminals.
• Oil storage facilities.
• Passenger vessel terminals.

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities are generally offshore fixed platforms in water depths ranging up to 1,000 feet deep whose primary purpose is the exploration, development, and/or product of offshore petroleum reserves. This definition also includes novel floating design such as:

• Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).
• Floating Production Facilities (converted MODUs).
• Floating Production Storage Offloading units (FPSO).

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate facility security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of facilities to designate security officers for facilities, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the facility’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels. Those facilities designated as Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities must meet the same security requirements as those designated as waterfront facilities.

When US Navy merchant vessels are in dangerous waters, security detachments are posted on the vessel. Security forces have helped deter piracy as well as terrorist attacks, such as the Maersk Alabama and the USS Cole. US Navy merchant vessels normally train the deck department in firearms training, but the added Navy security detail provides for extra security. Additionally, Navy escorts might sometimes accompany the vessels, such as traveling through the Straights of Gibraltar.

External links

• A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
• The Naval Institute On Maritime Security
• Maritime Security Specialists for the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean
• Port and Maritime Security Online
• Maritime Security Research Center
• Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security

The Government of Djibouti does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. The government made efforts to arrest traffickers and sustained partnerships with international organizations and foreign governments to address the confluence of human trafficking with smuggling in Djibouti. However, it did not improve implementation of the protection or prevention components of its anti-trafficking law, even within the government’s limited capacity. Specifically, the government did not take steps to improve efforts to criminally prosecute traffickers or institute procedures for law enforcement or other government authorities to identify and refer trafficking victims to available services. Addressing migrant smuggling and daunting refugee flows remained a main concern, diverting government attention and limited law enforcement resources that might otherwise have been devoted to detecting and responding to forms of trafficking occurring within the country’s borders.

Recommendations for Djibouti: Continue and expand a nationwide campaign to educate government officials and the general public on human trafficking, particularly highlighting the appropriate treatment of domestic workers under Djiboutian law; continue to work with judges, prosecutors, and police to clarify and apply the difference between cases of human trafficking and alien smuggling, particularly regarding courts’ application of Law 210 to cases of alien smuggling; form partnerships with local religious leaders, building their capacity and encouraging them to educate their congregations about trafficking; enforce the anti-trafficking statute through investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenders responsible for child prostitution, domestic servitude, or other forced labor offenses and provide data on convictions and sentences for trafficking offenders; institute a module on human trafficking as a standard part of the mandatory training program for new police and border guards; establish policies and procedures for government officials to proactively identify and interview potential trafficking victims and transfer them to the care, when appropriate, of local organizations; ensure police and relevant social welfare workers receive clear instructions regarding their specific roles and responsibilities in combating trafficking and protecting victims; and expand mechanisms for providing protective services to victims, possibly through the forging of partnerships with civil society or international organizations.

Prosecution

The government made modest efforts to enforce laws against human trafficking during the reporting period. Djibouti’s Law 210, “Regarding the Fight Against Human Trafficking,” enacted in December 2007, prohibits both forced labor and sex trafficking. The law also provides for the protection of victims regardless of ethnicity, gender, or nationality, and prescribes penalties of up to 30 years’ imprisonment for convicted trafficking offenders. These penalties are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Djiboutian law enforcement officers participated in human trafficking training programs sponsored by international organizations and foreign governments during the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government reported a total of 20 arrests related to trafficking under Law 210, down from 78 in 2009. The government did not, however, report any statistics on prosecutions, convictions, or sentences for forced prostitution or forced labor. Djiboutian authorities did not demonstrate concerted efforts to investigate or punish child trafficking, domestic servitude, or other forced labor offenses, nor did the government report any efforts to investigate or punish government officials complicit in trafficking offenses during the reporting period.

Protection

The government’s efforts to protect victims of trafficking increased slightly, but remained weak overall during the reporting period. With few resources itself and a small pool of underfunded NGO partners, the government had little means with which to address the needs of trafficking victims during the year. In December 2010, government officials received training from IOM and foreign governments on direct assistance to victims of trafficking. During 2010, IOM reported identifying 20 Ethiopian victims of trafficking, including 10 victims of forced labor, who were assisted through IOM in returning to their home communities. Djiboutian police reported rescuing 163 children from prostitution and providing them with basic medical services. It is unclear what protection services the government provided to these victims after their medical care. Djiboutian authorities did not have a formal, comprehensive system to proactively identify victims of trafficking among high-risk populations, such as illegal immigrants and those arrested for prostitution. The government regularly deported undocumented foreigners and there was no evidence that authorities screened them for indicators of human trafficking. Children found in prostitution may have been arrested, but reportedly were not charged with crimes. After detaining children on suspicion of engaging in prostitution, police indicated that they attempted to locate and meet their parents or other family members to discuss appropriate child protection; children were then released to the care of family members. When family members could not be found, foreign children may have been deported to their country of origin; the government did not report data on such deportations. Police worked with the Ministry of Health’s clinic and hospitals, and with NGOs, to provide some medical care to victims of child prostitution. The Government of Djibouti did not provide shelter or services directly to victims of trafficking, but collaborated with international and non-governmental institutions who offer such help. Although victims of trafficking were permitted to file civil suits against their traffickers, there did not appear to be any concerted encouragement from the government for victims to assist in criminal investigations of their traffickers. Foreign victims of trafficking are not offered legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they may face hardship or retribution.

Prevention

The government sustained partnerships with international organizations to prevent trafficking in persons. Addressing concerns for migrants who depart Djiboutian shores for intended illegal entry to Yemen, the government continued its partnership with IOM to inform immigrants of the potential dangers of irregular migration. The government worked to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by continuing to investigate some child prostitution cases and deploying a regular police vice squad. The government did not take any known measures to reduce the demand for forced labor.

1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT
1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration
& Nationality Directorate, Home Office from information obtained from a variety of sources.
1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the
asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended
to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in
asylum claims made in the United Kingdom
1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost
to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the
source material is readily available in the public domain.
1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains
within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.
1.5 An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following
organisations:

SOMALIA ASSESSMENT

Final report 
Assessment and recommendations
1. The situation in Somalia 
2. Piracy around the world 
3. Understanding piracy in Somalia 
4. The Legal Framework 
5. The costs of piracy 
6. The costs of doing nothing on land 
7. What has already been done 
8. Recommendations

somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated

Methods may differ whether it is about general financial decisions or environmental, ecological, or public health risk assessment.

Explanation

Risk assessment consists in an objective evaluation of risk in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly considered and presented. Part of the difficulty of risk management is that measurement of both of the quantities in which risk assessment is concerned – potential loss and probability of occurrence – can be very difficult to measure. The chance of error in the measurement of these two concepts is large. A risk with a large potential loss and a low probability of occurring is often treated differently from one with a low potential loss and a high likelihood of occurring. In theory, both are of nearly equal priority in dealing with first, but in practice it can be very difficult to manage when faced with the scarcity of resources, especially time, in which to conduct the risk management process. Expressed mathematically,

Risk assessment from a financial point of view.

Financial decisions, such as insurance, express loss in terms of dollar amounts. When risk assessment is used for public health or environmental decisions, loss can be quantified in a common metric,such as a country’s currency, or some numerical measure of a location’s quality of life. For public health and environmental decisions, loss is simply a verbal description of the outcome, such as increased cancer incidence or incidence of birth defects. In that case, the “risk” is expressed as:

If the risk estimate takes into account information on the number of individuals exposed, it is termed a “population risk” and is in units of expected increased cases per a time period. If the risk estimate does not take into account the number of individuals exposed, it is termed an “individual risk” and is in units of incidence rate per a time period. Population risks are of more use for cost/benefit analysis; individual risks are of more use for evaluating whether risks to individuals are “acceptable”….

Risk assessment in public health

In the context of public health, risk assessment is the process of quantifying the probability of a harmful effect to individuals or populations from certain human activities. In most countries, the use of specific chemicals, or the operations of specific facilities (e.g. power plants, manufacturing plants) is not allowed unless it can be shown that they do not increase the risk of death or illness above a specific threshold. For example, the American Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food safety through risk assessment.^[1] The FDA required in 1973 that cancer-causing compounds must not be present in meat at concentrations that would cause a cancer risk greater than 1 in a million lifetimes. The US Environmental Protection Agency provides basic information about environmental risk assessments for the public via its risk assessment portal.^[2]

How the risk is determined

In the estimation of the risks, three or more steps are involved, requiring the inputs of different disciplines:

1. Hazard Identification, aims to determine the qualitative nature of the potential adverse consequences of the contaminant (chemical, radiation, noise, etc.) and the strength of the evidence it can have that effect. This is done, for chemical hazards, by drawing from the results of the sciences of toxicology and epidemiology. For other kinds of hazard, engineering or other disciplines are involved.
2. Dose-Response Analysis, is determining the relationship between dose and the probability or the incidence of effect (dose-response assessment). The complexity of this step in many contexts derives mainly from the need to extrapolate results from experimental animals (e.g. mouse, rat) to humans, and/or from high to lower doses. In addition, the differences between individuals due to genetics or other factors mean that the hazard may be higher for particular groups, called susceptible populations. An alternative to dose-response estimation is to determine an effect unlikely to yield observable effects, that is, a no effect concentration. In developing such a dose, to account for the largely unknown effects of animal to human extrapolations, increased variability in humans, or missing data, a prudent approach is often adopted by including safety factors in the estimate of the “safe” dose, typically a factor of 10 for each unknown step.
3. Exposure Quantification, aims to determine the amount of a contaminant (dose) that individuals and populations will receive. This is done by examining the results of the discipline of exposure assessment. As different location, lifestyles and other factors likely influence the amount of contaminant that is received, a range or distribution of possible values is generated in this step. Particular care is taken to determine the exposure of the susceptible population(s).

Finally, the results of the three steps above are then combined to produce an estimate of risk. Because of the different susceptibilities and exposures, this risk will vary within a population.

Small subpopulations

When risks apply mainly to small subpopulations, there is uncertainty at which point intervention is necessary. What if a risk is very low for everyone but 0.1% of the population? A difference exists whether this 0.1% is represented by *all infants younger than X days or *recreational users of a particular product. If the risk is higher for a particular sub-population because of abnormal exposure rather than susceptibility, there is a potential to consider strategies to further reduce the exposure of that subgroup. If an identifiable sub-population is more susceptible due to inherent genetic or other factors, there is a policy choice whether to set policies for protecting the general population that are protective of such groups (as is currently done for children when data exists, or is done under the Clean Air Act for populations such as asthmatics) or whether if the group is too small, or the costs to high. Sometimes, a more specific calculation can be applied whether it is more important to analyze each method specifically the changes of the risk assessment method in containing all problems that each of us people could replace.

Acceptable risk increase

The idea of not increasing lifetime risk by more than one in a million has become common place in public health discourse and policy. How consensus settled on this particular figure is unclear. In some respects, this figure has the characteristics of a mythical number. In another sense, the figure provides a numerical basis for what to consider a negligible increase in risk. Some current environmental decision making allows some discretion to deem individual risks potentially “acceptable” if below one in ten thousand increased lifetime risk. Low risk criteria such as these do provide some protection for the case that individuals may be exposed to multiple chemicals (whether pollutants or food additives, or other chemicals). But both of these benchmarks are clearly small relative to the typical one in four lifetime risk of death by cancer (due to all causes combined) in developed countries. On the other hand, adoption of a zero-risk policy could be motivated by the fact that the 1 in a million policy still would cause the death of hundreds or thousands of people in a large enough population. In practice however, a true zero-risk is possible only with the suppression of the risk-causing activity.

More stringent requirements, or even the 1 in a million one, may not be technologically feasible at a given time, or so expensive as to render the risk-causing activity unsustainable, resulting in the optimal degree of intervention being a balance between risks vs. benefit. For example, it might well be that the emissions from hospital incinerators result in a certain number of deaths per year. However, this risk must be balanced against the available alternatives. In some unusual cases, there are significant public health risks, as well as economic costs, associated with all options. For example, there are risks associated with noincineration (with the potential risk for spread of infectious diseases) or even no hospitals. But, often further investigation identifies further options, such as separating noninfectious from infectious wastes, or air pollution controls on a medical incinerator, that provide a broad range of options of acceptable risk – though with varying practical implications and varying economic costs. Intelligent thought about a reasonably full set of options is essential. Thus, it is not unusual for there to be an iterative process between analysis, consideration of options, and then further analysis.

Risk assessment in auditing

In auditing, risk assessment is a very crucial stage before accepting an audit engagement. According to ISA315 Understanding the Entity and its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, “the auditor should perform risk assessment procedures to obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control.”<evidence relating to the auditor’s risk assessment of a material misstatement in the client’s financial statements. Then, auditor obtains initial evidence regarding the classes of transactions at the client and the operating effectiveness of the client’s internal controls.In auditing, audit risk includes inherent risk, control risk and detection risk.

Risk assessment and human health

There are many resources that provide health risk information. The National Library of Medicine provides risk assessment and regulation information tools for a varied audience.^[3] These include TOXNET (databases on hazardous chemicals, environmental health, and toxic releases),^[4] the Household Products Database (potential health effects of chemicals in over 10,000 common household products),^[5] and TOXMAP (maps of US Environmental Agency Superfund and Toxics Release Inventory data). The United States Environmental Protection Agency provides basic information about environmental risk assessments for the public.^[6]

Risk assessment in information security

IT risk assessment can be performed by a qualitative or quantitative approach, following different methodologies.

Risk assessment in project management

In project management, risk assessment is an integral part of the risk management plan, studying the probability, the impact, and the effect of every known risk on the project, as well as the corrective action to take should that risk occur.^[7]

Risk assessment for megaprojects

Megaprojects (sometimes also called “major programs”) are extremely large-scale investment projects, typically costing more than US$1 billion per project. Megaprojects include bridges, tunnels, highways, railways, airports, seaports, power plants, dams, wastewater projects, coastal flood protection, oil and natural gas extraction projects, public buildings, information technology systems, aerospace projects, and defence systems. Megaprojects have been shown to be particularly risky in terms of finance, safety, and social and environmental impacts. Risk assessment is therefore particularly pertinent for megaprojects and special methods and special education have been developed for such risk assessment.^[8][9]

Quantitative risk assessment

Quantitative risk assessments include a calculation of the single loss expectancy (SLE) of an asset. The single loss expectancy can be defined as the loss of value to asset based on a single security incident. The team then calculates the Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) of the threat to the asset. The ARO is an estimate based on the data of how often a threat would be successful in exploiting a vulnerability. From this information, the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) can be calculated. The annualized loss expectancy is a calculation of the single loss expectancy multiplied by the annual rate of occurrence, or how much an organization could estimate to lose from an asset based on the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities. It then becomes possible from a financial perspective to justify expenditures to implement countermeasures to protect the asset.

Risk assessment in software evolution

Studies have shown that early parts of the system development cycle such as requirements and design specifications are especially prone to error. This effect is particularly notorious in projects involving multiple stakeholders with different points of view. Evolutionary software processes offer an iterative approach to requirement engineering to alleviate the problems of uncertainty, ambiguity and inconsistency inherent in software developments.

Criticisms of quantitative risk assessment

Barry Commoner, Brian Wynne and other critics have expressed concerns that risk assessment tends to be overly quantitative and reductive. For example, they argue that risk assessments ignore qualitative differences among risks. Some charge that assessments may drop out important non-quantifiable or inaccessible information, such as variations among the classes of people exposed to hazards. Furthermore, Commoner and O’Brien claim that quantitative approaches divert attention from precautionary or preventative measures.^[10] Others, like Nassim Nicholas Taleb consider risk managers little more than “blind users” of statistical tools and methods.^[11]