BMP4_MaritimeSecurity.Asia

There are three main maritime security activities conducted by the Coast Guard:

• Port Security.
• Vessel Security.
• Facility Security.

See Anti-frogman techniques for precautions against underwater attack.

Legal Background

The principle laws that support this mission of the United States Coast Guard are:

• Espionage Act of 1917 - This act empowered the Coast Guard to make regulations to prevent damage to harbors and vessels during national security emergencies.
• Magnuson Act, 1950 – Enacted as a result of the “Red Scare,” this act provided permanent port security regulations, and broad powers to search vessels in U.S. waters and control the movement of foreign vessels in U.S. ports.
• Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 1972 – Resulting from several major groundings and oil spills, this act provided port safety authority beyond the Magnuson Act to protect the use of port transportation facilities, and to enhance efforts against the degradation of the marine environment.
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 or MTSA – Enacted as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. This Act provided sweeping new authorities for preventing acts of terrorism within the U.S. maritime domain.
• The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 2002 – Adopted by the International Maritime Organization as new provisions to the International Convention for SOLAS to enhance maritime security.

Port Security

The Port Security requirements found in the MTSA requires security measures for U.S. ports in order to reduce the risks and to mitigate the results of an act that threatens the security of personnel, facilities, vessels, and the public. The regulations draw together assets within port boundaries to provide a framework to communicate, identify risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and consequences. TheCOTP must ensure that the total port security posture is accurately assessed, and that security resources are appropriate to meet these programs. The COTP must identify critical assets within a port, develop a prioritized list of those most susceptible to acts of sabotage, and plan for adequate security measures to meet specific needs.

Vessel Security

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate vessel security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of vessels to designate security officers for vessels, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the vessel’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels.

Facility Security

A facility is defined as: any structure or facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and used, operated, or maintained by a public or private entity, including any contiguous or adjoining property under common ownership or operation. Some examples of facilities are:

• Barge fleeting facilities.
• Container terminals.
• Oil storage facilities.
• Passenger vessel terminals.

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities are generally offshore fixed platforms in water depths ranging up to 1,000 feet deep whose primary purpose is the exploration, development, and/or product of offshore petroleum reserves. This definition also includes novel floating design such as:

• Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).
• Floating Production Facilities (converted MODUs).
• Floating Production Storage Offloading units (FPSO).

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate facility security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of facilities to designate security officers for facilities, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the facility’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels. Those facilities designated as Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities must meet the same security requirements as those designated as waterfront facilities.

When US Navy merchant vessels are in dangerous waters, security detachments are posted on the vessel. Security forces have helped deter piracy as well as terrorist attacks, such as the Maersk Alabama and the USS Cole. US Navy merchant vessels normally train the deck department in firearms training, but the added Navy security detail provides for extra security. Additionally, Navy escorts might sometimes accompany the vessels, such as traveling through the Straights of Gibraltar.

External links

• A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
• The Naval Institute On Maritime Security
• Maritime Security Specialists for the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean
• Port and Maritime Security Online
• Maritime Security Research Center
• Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security

1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT
1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information & Policy Unit, Immigration
& Nationality Directorate, Home Office from information obtained from a variety of sources.
1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the
asylum determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive, nor is it intended
to catalogue all human rights violations. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in
asylum claims made in the United Kingdom
1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost
to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the
source material is readily available in the public domain.
1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a 6-monthly basis while the country remains
within the top 35 asylum producing countries in the United Kingdom.
1.5 An electronic copy of the assessment has been made available to the following
organisations:

SOMALIA ASSESSMENT

Final report 
Assessment and recommendations
1. The situation in Somalia 
2. Piracy around the world 
3. Understanding piracy in Somalia 
4. The Legal Framework 
5. The costs of piracy 
6. The costs of doing nothing on land 
7. What has already been done 
8. Recommendations

somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated

was born in Abrantes on the 8th August 1959, joined the Portuguese Naval Academy in 1977 and graduated in 1982.

As junior officer he served in “João Coutinho” and “Baptista de Andrade” corvette classes, and also “Cacine” patrol boat class, in a wide variety of functions. Appointed as Executive Officer and Operations Officer of the corvette N.R.P. “Afonso Cerqueira” (September 1987-November 1989),he was also Commanding Officer of the patrol boats N.R.P. “Quanza” (November 1989-November 1990) and N.R.P. “Cunene” (November 1990-August 1991).

He was promoted to Lieutenant Commander in 1991 and served in the Naval Tactical Centre as head of the ASW training department and later as Deputy Director. From September 1993 until August 1995 he acted as Deputy Operations Officer in the Operational Command of Madeira Island.

From August 1996 until June 1999 he was the Executive Officer of N.R.P. “Álvares Cabral” (Vasco da Gama frigate class). Promoted to Commander in 2000, served in the personnel and training areas.

In October 2003 Commodore Alberto Correia took over the command of the frigate “Vasco da Gama” for a three years period.

In September 2006 he was appointed as Commander of the Escorts Squadron and from October 2006 till September 2008 he assumed the command of the Portuguese Task Group and the Portuguese Joint Immediate Reaction Force.

In February 2011 he was designated to become Force Commander of the EU Naval Operation Atalanta in April 2011.

Commodore Alberto Correia is a Principal Warfare Officer-Underwater specialist and, among several other courses, attended the General Naval Warfare Course, Tactics and Naval Operations Course, the Maritime Warfare Course and the Joint Senior Command Course. He was also given specific formation and training in the command and control and weapons systems of the “Vasco da Gama” class frigates as well as in the human resources area.

Commodore Alberto Correia lives in Oeiras, is married to Ana Paula Martins and has two children, Ricardo and Catarina.

He attended the Military School “Nunziatella” in Naples from 1975 to 1979 and then the Italian Naval Academy in Livorno, where he graduated in 1983. Upon graduation and specialization in Weaponry and Gunnery, he was appointed in Weapon System Branch onboard ITS PERSEO and ITS ALISEO (respectively “LUPO” and “MAESTRALE” class) till 1990.

From 1991 to 1992 he was Commanding Officer of ITS SIMETO, a Navy’s Water Tanker involved in supplying of potable water of the several little islands surrounding Sicily, and carried out a humanitarian mission of water supply of the city of Dubrovnik (Croatia) during the crisis of Former Yugoslavia civil war in 1991; from 1999 to 2000, with rank of Commander, he was XO onboard destroyer MIMBELLI and then, form 2000 to 2002, C.O. of ITS ALISEO (assigned to STANAVFORMED from August to December 2001 and involved in Operation Active Endeavour after the 11/9 crisis).

Promoted Captain in 2003, from 2005 to 2006 he was CO of destroyer Luigi Durand De La Penne, employed in Operation MIMOSA during crisis between Israel and Lebanon in July 2006: in that occasion, ITS Durand De La Penne was the first military ship to enter in Beirut harbour after the bombing by the Israeli Air Force, and evacuated from Beirut more than 700 civilian, citizens from Italy and other European countries.

From June 2008 to September 2010 he served as Chief of Italian Mine Countermeasures Forces (COMFORDRAG) and, in 2009, he was also appointed as Chief of Italian Auxiliary Forces (COMFORAUS).

RAdm RANDO’s ashore commitments include duties as Instructor and Vice Commandant of Cadets at Naval Academy and different duties to the Navy’s and Defence Joint HQ Personnel Department, as Section Chief of Navy’s and Armed Forces’ Officers recruiting, promotion and duties assignment. He attended staff courses in the Navy’s and Defence War colleges.

He also was appointed as Head of Research Branch of Navy Personnel Department.

R.A. RANDO is married to Anna and they have one son and two daughters.

Buster Howes was educated at Christ’s Hospital, and York and London Universities.  He was commissioned into the Royal Marines in 1982.  The majority of his regimental experience has been within the United Kingdom’s Amphibious Force, within which he has commanded at every level from troop to brigade.

With the exception of a tour in Northern Ireland, all his operational experience has been gained within a multi-national environment.  In the First Gulf War, he served as the Regimental SO3 Operations in the 2nd Marine Division, conducting amphibious operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf.  In Bosnia, he served as the SO2 Plans in the Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff of UNPROFOR.  He returned to the Gulf in 2003 as the Commanding Officer of 42 Commando, for which he was awarded the OBE.  In 2007, he served as Chief Joint Coordination and Effects in HQ ISAF X in Kabul.

His staff experience has been gained exclusively within the Naval and Joint Staffs.  On the Naval Staffs, he worked as the SO2 N1 in CINCFLEET, the SO1 Strategy within the Naval Staff Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, subsequently returning as the 1-Star Director of the Naval Staff.  In the Joint Staffs, he served as a Divisional Director at the UK Joint Command and Staff College, as Chief of Staff to the Commander UK Amphibious Force, and most recently as Head of Overseas Operations in the Ministry of Defence.

He has attended the Royal Navy Staff Course at Greenwich, the Higher Command and Staff Course, the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Pinnacle Course.

He has been appointed as Commander of the United Kingdom Amphibious Force and Commandant General Royal Marines from February 2010 and from June 2010 he assumed the appointment of Operation Commander EU NAVFOR Somalia.

He has twin daughters and his interests are teaching them table manners and repairing things they break.  In his spare time he enjoys mountaineering, gardening, art and ideas.

Major General Buster Howes OBE

Buster Howes was educated at Christ’s Hospital, and York and London Universities.  He was commissioned into the Royal Marines in 1982.  The majority of his regimental experience has been within the United Kingdom’s Amphibious Force, within which he has commanded at every level from troop to brigade.

With the exception of a tour in Northern Ireland, all his operational experience has been gained within a multi-national environment.  In the First Gulf War, he served as the Regimental SO3 Operations in the 2nd Marine Division, conducting amphibious operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf.  In Bosnia, he served as the SO2 Plans in the Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff of UNPROFOR.  He returned to the Gulf in 2003 as the Commanding Officer of 42 Commando, for which he was awarded the OBE.  In 2007, he served as Chief Joint Coordination and Effects in HQ ISAF X in Kabul.

His staff experience has been gained exclusively within the Naval and Joint Staffs.  On the Naval Staffs, he worked as the SO2 N1 in CINCFLEET, the SO1 Strategy within the Naval Staff Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, subsequently returning as the 1-Star Director of the Naval Staff.  In the Joint Staffs, he served as a Divisional Director at the UK Joint Command and Staff College, as Chief of Staff to the Commander UK Amphibious Force, and most recently as Head of Overseas Operations in the Ministry of Defence.

He has attended the Royal Navy Staff Course at Greenwich, the Higher Command and Staff Course, the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Pinnacle Course.

He has been appointed as Commander of the United Kingdom Amphibious Force and Commandant General Royal Marines from February 2010 and from June 2010 he assumed the appointment of Operation Commander EU NAVFOR Somalia.

He has twin daughters and his interests are teaching them table manners and repairing things they break.  In his spare time he enjoys mountaineering, gardening, art and ideas.

Operation ATALANTA is an EU Military Mission established on 8 December 2008 in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, to contribute to the deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

Major General Buster Howes Royal Marines is currently appointed as the Operation Commander for the EU’s first Naval Operation, within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, and leads the Operation Command Headquarters of 76 staff based at Northwood, UK.

At any one time the EU NAVFOR will comprise of up to 6 Frigates and 3 to 5 Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA).

The mission is divided into three key areas:

1. The protection of United Nations World Food Programme Shipping delivering humanitarian food aid to Somalia;
2. The protection of merchant vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden or in proximity to Somalia;
3. The deterrence and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

The following EU Member States have committed assets to EUNAVFOR – Finland, Greece, France, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK.

EU Warships are working closely with World Food Programme. So far, we have delivered food into Somalia that will feed more than 2 million people. The force has been heavily involved in counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden helping to protect many of the 25000 ships that transit the region every year. EU has established the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa in partnership with industry to improve coordination between commercial shipping and international military forces in the region.

With up to 95% of EU member state’ trade (by volume) transported by sea and 20% of Global trade passing through the Gulf of Aden, EUNAVFOR provide considerable focus to safeguard trade through this strategic area.

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) is an initiative established by EUNAVFOR with close co-operation from industry. The MSC(HOA) centre provides 24 hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden whilst the provision of an interactive website enables the Centre to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to industry and for Shipping Companies and operators to register their movements through the region.

Finally in between routine or baseline operations, EUNAVFOR conducts focused operations aimed at achieving specific effects within a given area or time window. By concentrating forces to achieve specific effects EUNAVFOR can provide influence, deterrence or insight into legitimate and illicit activities in order to better co-ordinate future activities to deter piracy and armed robbery and thus reassure legitimate merchant mariners.

Cmdr John Harbour said the men had to be released because the crew of the cargo vessel refused to give evidence.

The suspected pirates were allegedly part of a gang who attacked the Panamanian-flagged ship MV Almezaan.

Security guards on board the ship opened fire, killing one of the attackers before an EU warship arrived.

It is believed to be the first time that private security guards have killed a pirate in recent years.

We had to release them because the master of the ship would not testify Cmdr John Harbour EU naval force Spotlight on ‘guns for hire’

It has sparked a debate about whether more ships should travel with guards.

Some say it might encourage pirates to use more violence, while others say it would help deter attacks.

Cmdr Harbour told the BBC that the case against the suspects captured on Tuesday was “clear-cut”.

“We intercepted the pirates, we destroyed their mother-ship and we went on board the cargo ship to get statements,” he said.

“But we had to release them because the master of the ship would not testify.”

The guards who shot the pirate suspect were also likely to avoid any censure, with Cmdr Harbour saying nothing could be done without statements from those involved.

Body discovered

The EU force, known as Navfor, received a distress signal early on Tuesday from the MV Almezaan.

Navfor said members of an “armed private vessel-protection detachment” on board the ship had been involved in a fire-fight with pirates.

The EU force sent the Spanish warship Navarra to the area and found the pirate suspects trying to flee the area in two skiffs.

When a team from the Navarra boarded the vessels, they found three men in one skiff and three in the second, along with the body of a fourth man.

The authorities have struggled to find a solution to the problem of piracy – both stopping the attacks, and how to punish captured suspects.

War-wracked Somalia has no functioning central government and the chaos there has allowed the pirates to function with relative impunity.

The suspects are often sent to Kenya, where dozens are languishing in jails awaiting trial in a chronically overburdened legal system.

But there is no consensus on how to prosecute the suspects, and moves to set up an international tribunal have foundered.

A South Korean navy warship is in pursuit of a huge oil tanker, hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean.

The 300,000-tonne Samho Dream, which was on its way from Iraq to the United States, has 24 crew on board, and is loaded with crude oil.

Reports suggest the Korean destroyer is fast enough to catch up to the tanker before it reaches the Somali coast.

Pirates targeting ships off the coast of Somalia made tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments last year.

South Korea is one of several Asian nations that have an anti-piracy warship patrolling Somali waters to guard against hijackings. Western navies are also trying to protect ships against pirate attack.

Volatile cargo

The destroyer now in pursuit of the South Korea-operated, Singapore-owned tanker was on anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden – one of the world’s busiest and most dangerous shipping lanes.

It has been diverted some 1,500 km (930 miles) south-east of the Gulf to the area where the hijacking took place.

A South Korean official said the destroyer had been ordered to intercept the hijacked vessel on its expected route into Somali waters, according to Yonhap news agency.

He also expressed concern for the safety of the crew – five South Koreans and 19 Filipinos – but said the government would not negotiate with the pirates.

It is unclear what action the warship will take once it reaches the tanker.

The BBC’s East Africa correspondent Will Ross says that it is extremely rare for any navy to use force once hostages have been taken.

Given the nature of the cargo there is also the risk of immense environmental damage, he adds.

Oil ambition

The value of the Samho Dream’s cargo is estimated at about $170m (£111.7m).

Reuters reported that the US refiner Valero Energy Corp said it was the owner of the crude oil cargo.

It said a pirate source named Mohamed had said the ship was heading for Haradheere, the pirates’ base at which many ships are held during ransom negotiations.

At least four South Korean ships have been hijacked by Somali pirates in recent years: a tuna ship with 25 crew in 2006, two ships and 24 crew (held captive for six months) in 2007, and a cargo ship with 22 sailors in September 2008.

The crew in that last attack were released after the ship’s owner paid a ransom.

The first successful hijacking of a so-called Very Large Crude Carrier was of the Saudi-owned Sirius Star in late 2008.

Another VLCC, the Maran Centaurus, was taken last November and held for two months before a ransom estimated at between $5.5m and $7m was paid.