BMP4_MaritimeSecurity.Asia

Industry’s focus when revising Best Management Practice has been on targeting the document at seafarers. With this in mind, BMP3 has been produced as a pocket-sized booklet, in a new and clearer format, which includes illustrations and a small chart of the region. The production of the booklet will commence shortly and a comprehensive list of organisations from whom the booklet will be available will be published shortly.

It is important that shipping companies make all efforts to distribute this booklet to their ships and their crews so that BMP 3 can be followed and implemented as a tool for counter piracy by those Masters and crews during transit through the High Risk Areas.

Please find 2 versions of BMP 3, one high resolution for registered users  and one  low resolution for the public area of the website .

Additional advice augmenting BMP3 will be accessible on the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) web site.

There are three main maritime security activities conducted by the Coast Guard:

• Port Security.
• Vessel Security.
• Facility Security.

See Anti-frogman techniques for precautions against underwater attack.

Legal Background

The principle laws that support this mission of the United States Coast Guard are:

• Espionage Act of 1917 – This act empowered the Coast Guard to make regulations to prevent damage to harbors and vessels during national security emergencies.
• Magnuson Act, 1950 – Enacted as a result of the “Red Scare,” this act provided permanent port security regulations, and broad powers to search vessels in U.S. waters and control the movement of foreign vessels in U.S. ports.
• Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 1972 – Resulting from several major groundings and oil spills, this act provided port safety authority beyond the Magnuson Act to protect the use of port transportation facilities, and to enhance efforts against the degradation of the marine environment.
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 or MTSA – Enacted as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. This Act provided sweeping new authorities for preventing acts of terrorism within the U.S. maritime domain.
• The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 2002 – Adopted by the International Maritime Organization as new provisions to the International Convention for SOLAS to enhance maritime security.

Port Security

The Port Security requirements found in the MTSA requires security measures for U.S. ports in order to reduce the risks and to mitigate the results of an act that threatens the security of personnel, facilities, vessels, and the public. The regulations draw together assets within port boundaries to provide a framework to communicate, identify risks, and coordinate resources to mitigate threats and consequences. TheCOTP must ensure that the total port security posture is accurately assessed, and that security resources are appropriate to meet these programs. The COTP must identify critical assets within a port, develop a prioritized list of those most susceptible to acts of sabotage, and plan for adequate security measures to meet specific needs.

Vessel Security

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate vessel security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of vessels to designate security officers for vessels, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the vessel’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels.

Facility Security

A facility is defined as: any structure or facility of any kind located in, on, under, or adjacent to any waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and used, operated, or maintained by a public or private entity, including any contiguous or adjoining property under common ownership or operation. Some examples of facilities are:

• Barge fleeting facilities.
• Container terminals.
• Oil storage facilities.
• Passenger vessel terminals.

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities are generally offshore fixed platforms in water depths ranging up to 1,000 feet deep whose primary purpose is the exploration, development, and/or product of offshore petroleum reserves. This definition also includes novel floating design such as:

• Tension Leg Platforms (TLP).
• Floating Production Facilities (converted MODUs).
• Floating Production Storage Offloading units (FPSO).

Both MTSA and the ISPS Code regulate facility security. The regulations within these two documents require the owners or operators of facilities to designate security officers for facilities, develop security plans based on security assessments, implement security measures specific to the facility’s operation, and comply with current Marine Security levels. Those facilities designated as Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities must meet the same security requirements as those designated as waterfront facilities.

When US Navy merchant vessels are in dangerous waters, security detachments are posted on the vessel. Security forces have helped deter piracy as well as terrorist attacks, such as the Maersk Alabama and the USS Cole. US Navy merchant vessels normally train the deck department in firearms training, but the added Navy security detail provides for extra security. Additionally, Navy escorts might sometimes accompany the vessels, such as traveling through the Straights of Gibraltar.

Many jurisdictions require PIs to be licensed, and they may or may not carry firearms depending on local laws. Some are ex-police officers, some are former law enforcement agents, some are ex-spies and some are ex-military, some used to work in a private military company, some are former bodyguards and security guards, although many are not. While PIs may investigate criminal matters, most do not have police powers, and as such they cannot arrest or detain suspects. They are expected to keep detailed notes and to be prepared to testify in court regarding any of their observations on behalf of their clients. Great care is required to remain within the scope of the law, otherwise the investigator may face criminal charges. Irregular hours may also be required when performing surveillance work.^[1]

PIs also engage in a large variety of work that is not usually associated with the industry in the mind of the public. For example, many PIs are involved in process serving, the personal delivery of summons, subpoenas and other legal documents to parties in a legal case. The tracing of absconding debtors can also form a large part of a PI’s work load. Many agencies specialize in a particular field of expertise. For example, some PI agencies deal only in tracing. Others may specialize intechnical surveillance counter-measures (TSCM), sometimes called electronic counter measures (ECM), which is the locating and dealing with unwanted forms of electronic surveillance (for example, a bugged boardroom for industrial espionage purposes). Other PIs, also known as Corporate Investigators, specialise in corporate matters, including anti-fraud work, the protection of intellectual property and trade secrets, anti-piracy, copyright infringement investigations, due diligenceinvestigations and computer forensics work.^[1]

Increasingly, modern PIs prefer to be known as “professional investigators” or Licensed Private Investigators (LPI’s) rather than “private investigators” or “private detectives”. This is a response to the image that is sometimes attributed to the profession and an effort to establish and demonstrate the industry to be a proper and respectable profession.^[1] However, in 2009 a Toronto Star journalist obtained a private investigator’s licence in Ontario with no training, and reported that other Ontarians had done the same.^[2]

Cmdr John Harbour said the men had to be released because the crew of the cargo vessel refused to give evidence.

The suspected pirates were allegedly part of a gang who attacked the Panamanian-flagged ship MV Almezaan.

Security guards on board the ship opened fire, killing one of the attackers before an EU warship arrived.

It is believed to be the first time that private security guards have killed a pirate in recent years.

We had to release them because the master of the ship would not testify Cmdr John Harbour EU naval force Spotlight on ‘guns for hire’

It has sparked a debate about whether more ships should travel with guards.

Some say it might encourage pirates to use more violence, while others say it would help deter attacks.

Cmdr Harbour told the BBC that the case against the suspects captured on Tuesday was “clear-cut”.

“We intercepted the pirates, we destroyed their mother-ship and we went on board the cargo ship to get statements,” he said.

“But we had to release them because the master of the ship would not testify.”

The guards who shot the pirate suspect were also likely to avoid any censure, with Cmdr Harbour saying nothing could be done without statements from those involved.

Body discovered

The EU force, known as Navfor, received a distress signal early on Tuesday from the MV Almezaan.

Navfor said members of an “armed private vessel-protection detachment” on board the ship had been involved in a fire-fight with pirates.

The EU force sent the Spanish warship Navarra to the area and found the pirate suspects trying to flee the area in two skiffs.

When a team from the Navarra boarded the vessels, they found three men in one skiff and three in the second, along with the body of a fourth man.

The authorities have struggled to find a solution to the problem of piracy – both stopping the attacks, and how to punish captured suspects.

War-wracked Somalia has no functioning central government and the chaos there has allowed the pirates to function with relative impunity.

The suspects are often sent to Kenya, where dozens are languishing in jails awaiting trial in a chronically overburdened legal system.

But there is no consensus on how to prosecute the suspects, and moves to set up an international tribunal have foundered.

A South Korean navy warship is in pursuit of a huge oil tanker, hijacked by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean.

The 300,000-tonne Samho Dream, which was on its way from Iraq to the United States, has 24 crew on board, and is loaded with crude oil.

Reports suggest the Korean destroyer is fast enough to catch up to the tanker before it reaches the Somali coast.

Pirates targeting ships off the coast of Somalia made tens of millions of dollars in ransom payments last year.

South Korea is one of several Asian nations that have an anti-piracy warship patrolling Somali waters to guard against hijackings. Western navies are also trying to protect ships against pirate attack.

Volatile cargo

The destroyer now in pursuit of the South Korea-operated, Singapore-owned tanker was on anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden – one of the world’s busiest and most dangerous shipping lanes.

It has been diverted some 1,500 km (930 miles) south-east of the Gulf to the area where the hijacking took place.

A South Korean official said the destroyer had been ordered to intercept the hijacked vessel on its expected route into Somali waters, according to Yonhap news agency.

He also expressed concern for the safety of the crew – five South Koreans and 19 Filipinos – but said the government would not negotiate with the pirates.

It is unclear what action the warship will take once it reaches the tanker.

The BBC’s East Africa correspondent Will Ross says that it is extremely rare for any navy to use force once hostages have been taken.

Given the nature of the cargo there is also the risk of immense environmental damage, he adds.

Oil ambition

The value of the Samho Dream’s cargo is estimated at about $170m (£111.7m).

Reuters reported that the US refiner Valero Energy Corp said it was the owner of the crude oil cargo.

It said a pirate source named Mohamed had said the ship was heading for Haradheere, the pirates’ base at which many ships are held during ransom negotiations.

At least four South Korean ships have been hijacked by Somali pirates in recent years: a tuna ship with 25 crew in 2006, two ships and 24 crew (held captive for six months) in 2007, and a cargo ship with 22 sailors in September 2008.

The crew in that last attack were released after the ship’s owner paid a ransom.

The first successful hijacking of a so-called Very Large Crude Carrier was of the Saudi-owned Sirius Star in late 2008.

Another VLCC, the Maran Centaurus, was taken last November and held for two months before a ransom estimated at between $5.5m and $7m was paid.

The SW monsoons normally commence towards the end of May / beginning of June and last until the end of August / early September.

There were no piracy incidents in the Indian Ocean reported as happening in June, July and August last year. Pirates, hampered by rough seas and strong winds, look for other hunting grounds. Increased activity was duly recorded in the Gulf of Aden and in the southern part of the Red Sea, where the prevailing weather conditions are not so intense. The first vessel successfully hijacked in the Red Sea was taken on 4 July 2010.

2011 has witnessed similar heightened activity in the Red Sea, with 15 incidents for the year – 11 of which have taken place since 20 May. This recent increase is a cause for concern.

Over the weekend of 10-12 June the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) received reports of three vessels targeted in the Indian Ocean approximately 450 NM east of Socotra. Two incidents took place on the same day, in almost the same position and within two hours of one another, suggesting the possible involvement of the same pirate action group. A bulk carrier was first fired upon, then a chemical tanker was targeted. The following day, a Panamax bulk carrier was fired on in almost the same position.

Reports from two of the Masters over these two days suggest that the seas were very rough when the attacks occurred. Winds were reported to be in the region of Beaufort force 7 (around 34 mph) with sea swells of approximately 4.5 metres. These are not normally conditions conducive to launching attacks from small attack skiffs.

The success ratio of hijacks to attempted attacks has decreased from one in every four and a half vessels targeted being hijacked in 2010 to one in just over seven vessels in 2011. This is attributed to more robust naval involvement and to increased ship protection measures. The number of overall attacks has however risen year on year. It may be that these recent Indian Ocean incidents are a sign of desperation on behalf of the pirates, or that there are many more Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) operating now than there were in 2010, particularly outside the Gulf of Aden. Robust action against the mother ships remains the only viable response to prevent further attacks.

The recent attacks have shown that, contrary to past experience, the threat of Indian Ocean piracy during the monsoon seasons continues. Masters are therefore advised to maintain a heightened status of readiness, to implement self-protection measures in accordance with Version 3 of the Best Management Practice, and to report all incidents, be they actual or attempted attacks.

CCS comprises three specialised Bureaux, which operate as an autonomous membership association offering its members a full range of resources. Companies and individuals can become members of an individual Bureau according to their business type and requirements, or in more complex situations they may benefit from association with more than one Bureau. A breakdown of the membership fee structure can be found in the Membership section.

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

Dedicated to the prevention of trade finance, maritime, transport and trade fraud and malpractice, the IMB is a focal point for the international trading and shipping industry and those associated with facilitating the movement of goods. The IMB also manages the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, which is dedicated to the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Financial Investigation Bureau (FIB)

Formerly known as the Commercial Crime Bureau, FIB provides commercial banks, the financial services sector and investors with a range of ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC), financial fraud and anti-money laundering services that help members balance risk against reward and avoid becoming the victims of financial scams.

Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB)

CIB is one of the world’s leading organisations dedicated to combating the counterfeiting of products and documents, protecting the integrity of intellectual property and brands, and preventing copyright abuse. CIB hosts the International Hologram Image Register and publishes the International Anti-Counterfeiting Directory annually.

FraudNet

CCS also operates FraudNet, a unique global network of law firms who specialise in tackling business crime.

Members of CCS comprise companies engaged in international business, the legal profession and law enforcement, dealing with shipping, transport and trade, banking, insurance, intellectual property and information technology.

Over two decades, CCS has saved its members literally billions of dollars by alerting them to the threats and highlighting the preventative measures they can take to protect themselves. It has also succeeded in getting fraudsters brought to justice and has helped members recover many millions of dollars thought lost.

For full details about each Bureau and its services please go to the relevant section of this website.